Somalia's President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo (left) and his Kenyan
counterpart Uhuru Kenyatta during a press conference in Nairobi on
November 14, 2019. PHOTO | PSCU
Kenya’s performance on the international stage in 2019 could be debatable, depending on who you ask.
President
Uhuru Kenyatta, in his New Year’s message, claimed the year saw the
country’s profile “soar” through sportspeople, scientists and... “our
leadership in areas of international peace and diplomacy".
The
President may have been referring to conferences Nairobi hosted, such
as the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD25),
and victories like being re-elected to the Council of the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO), as well as the African Union endorsement of
Kenya’s candidature for the UN seat.
This
was also the year when Nairobi lost opportunities to host the nascent
AU free trade secretariat (AfCTA) to Ghana and the regional offices for
the Afrexim Bank to Uganda.
In
2020, the bar could be higher for Kenyan diplomats. Here are the key
areas that could pre-occupy Nairobi for the next 12 months.
• Maritime dispute with Somalia
Somalia’s case at the International Court of Justice largely punctuated relations between the countries in 2018.
Kenya
accused Somalia of auctioning oil blocks in the disputed area, charges
Mogadishu denied, but Nairobi went ahead to pull plugs on bilateral
relations, which were only normalised in November.
With
the ICJ decision binding on both sides, Nairobi has been lobbying to
have the issue resolved out of court, arguing the judges may not
consider the political compromises attached to the dispute.
How
will it go? The ICJ is due to hear, and determine, the case in June but
Nairobi’s lobbyists say the matter may not end there, especially since
the Court lacks powers to enforce the binding decisions.
Whatever happens at the court, before or after the verdict, also depends on political movements in Somalia.
As
Somali President Mohamed Farmaajo seeks to consolidate power, and seek
re-election; his key headache has been how to secure the country, and
make federal states toe his line.
Ahead
of elections, the maritime issue has become a nationalistic debate with
anyone opposed to case branded a traitor. In the meantime, Nairobi may
hope that whoever wins the election, if it is held at all, will accept
to discuss an amicable solution to the boundary issue.
• UN Security Council seat
Kenya
won African Union’s endorsement to contest for the non-permanent UN
Security Council seat last year, but the victory appeared more of a
triumph in a battel rather a war.
While
AU is not a member of the UN, the continental body has traditionally
been endorsing candidates, based on regional rotation, “to act in its
name” at the UN. It means that an endorsement often almost guarantees
you victory at the UN.
For
Kenya, however, its initial competitor, Djibouti, has refused to give
away and has gone on to launch a parallel campaign directly to UN
members. Djibouti argues AU’s procedure of endorsing Kenya was flawed
and did not consider the fact that Kenya has been there twice before
(Djibouti once).
How
will Kenya do it? A group of diplomats, led by the Diplomatic and
Political Secretary Tom Amolo and Kenya’s Permanent Representative to
the UN Lazarus Amayo, have been marketing the country to UN members,
promising to defend multilateralism and the link with regional blocs.
However,
if the contest goes down to the wire, Nairobi could be forced to do
another lobbying among African states for the vote as it needs at least
129 votes at the UN.
A
victory at the June elections could be the ultimate prize, but a loss
against Djibouti could be an embarrassment everyone in Nairobi wants to
avoid.
• Border problems with neighbours
Related
to the maritime dispute, Nairobi has several unfinished boundary
problems with neighbours. In 2018, Kenya signed an MoU with Uganda and
South Sudan to help demarcate their borders.
It
agreed to a joint administration of Migingo Island, an unresolved issue
for the last 15 years. According to Foreign Affairs CS Monica Juma, the
MoU is not to give away part of Kenya but is meant to clarify each
country’s territory.
Uganda
has been Kenya’s biggest trading partner in Africa, though it now sells
more than it buys to Kenya, and diplomats had argued the Migingo issue
needed a slow action to avoid antagonising a good neighbour.
In
South Sudan, the Ilemi Triangle remains an unmarked boundary and has
often seen the Topossa fight it out with the Turkana of Kenya over
grazing lands.
The
communities are pastoralist so these kinds of raids are expected but the
region is suspected to have important minerals, a possible ticking time
bomb if borders are unmarked.
• Regional integration and trade
Kenya has traditionally declared that it fully supports regional integration.
It
was a founding member of the re-established East African Community, and
President Uhuru Kenyatta launched what he called ‘economic diplomacy’
when he took power.
In
2018, Kenya was among the first countries to sign the AfCFTA meant to
open borders. Yet within the East African Community, occasional tiffs
often happen.
Last
year, Uganda complained there was little “synergy” in policies to enable
smooth flow of goods. Nairobi argues it granted Kampala privileges to
enable faster importation or exportation through the port of Mombasa.
In 2018, Uganda sold more goods to Kenya than it bought.
While
the East African Community's provisions allow free flow of goods
manufactured in the region without unnecessary tariffs, how Kenya
protects local manufacturers, while expanding on regional integration
could be the key challenge for Nairobi.
In
the meantime, Nairobi says it will also be seeking opportunities beyond
Africa, starting with the upcoming UK-Africa Investment Summit later
this month in London.
• Counter-terrorism and security
This
year will mark nine years since Kenya Defence Forces went to Somalia,
and eight years since they were re-hatted to the African Union Mission
after the fall of Kismayu.
This
year, Amisom will begin its gradual withdrawal from Somalia. Francisco
Madeira, the Mozambican diplomat in charge of Amisom, said on New Year’s
Day that the first batch of 1000 Amisom troops will pull out of Somalia
in February, and will be replaced by trained local forces.
With
Somalia planning for elections however, Mogadishu is attracting
interests from both the Horn of Africa, Middle East and the West.
The
dilemma is whether Somalia can now handle own security, or whether
Amisom should stay longer. In the meantime, Kenya continues to be hit by
terror group Al-Shabaab, ostensibly because KDF are in Somalia.
Kenya
insists the troops will remain in Somalia as long as Amisom stays. The
problem, however, is that few people are willing to pay for the troops
to stay.
Nairobi’s defence and foreign policy chiefs could, in 2019, be engaged on this matter, with partners.
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