The EAC-led Inter-Burundi Dialogue, with Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni as chief mediator and former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa
as facilitator, tried – and failed – to mediate between the government
and the opposition, both those in exile and those who remained
in-country. ILLLUSTRATION | JOHN NYAGA | NMG
Presidential elections in Burundi are less than a year away and a repeat of the violence that marred the last poll seems likely.
In
April 2015, President Pierre Nkurunziza sparked months of mass protests
and brutal repression when he sought – and later won – a contested
third term.
Since then, Nkurunziza and the ruling party
pushed through a referendum to change the Constitution, potentially
enabling the president to stay in power until 2034. Nkurunziza says he
will not stand, but with the vote looming, tensions remain dangerously
high.
Four years ago, the African Union denounced
Nkurunziza’s decision to seek a third term and refused to observe the
subsequent polls, calling for their delay because the conditions were
not conducive to free and fair elections.
Today, with many expecting government interference in the ballot and the risk of confrontations rising, the AU should act.
African
heads of state should press the government to open the political space,
in particular letting opposition politicians campaign freely and safely
and allowing in international observers, in order to prevent a reprise
of past violence or worse.
Already, there are worrying signs ahead of next year’s vote.
Competition for power among ruling party cadres, although under the
surface for now, remains acute.
Over 400,000 people
fled to neighbouring countries following the 2015 violence and nearly
350,000 remain abroad. A small number of them have joined armed groups,
which, although unable to have a strong impact, remain active in the
region.
Opposition
In
the country, the security services and the Imbonerakure, the ruling
party’s youth militia, continue to crack down on the opposition, many of
whose members have been attacked, arbitrarily arrested or killed, or
have disappeared.
The National Congress for Liberty,
long-time opposition leader Agathon Rwasa’s new party, has suffered a
particularly ferocious assault.
Even the Catholic
Church, the country’s primary moral authority, has come under verbal
attack during government orchestrated protests. In February, the
government forced the UN Human Rights Office to close its Burundian
operations.
Meanwhile, uncertainty over Nkurunziza’s
intentions adds a volatile element to the mix. Although he has said he
will step down, many Burundians and international actors do not believe
him.
Since 2015 and even before, senior officials, including in the army, have strongly objected to his presiding in perpetuity.
Indeed,
this was a major cause of violence in 2015. If he does seek another
term, he will face opposition from within the party and perhaps again on
the streets.
This would increase the sense that the
country is drifting ever further from the inclusivity enshrined in the
2000 Arusha peace agreement that brought an end to Burundi’s civil war.
Conversely,
if he does not run, a likely scenario is a fierce struggle to succeed
him within the ruling party. Intra-party competition in 2015 resulted in
an attempted coup and subsequent violent crackdown.
Poll observers
After
its initial firm reaction to Burundi’s violence and decision not to
deploy observers for the 2015 vote, the AU became less involved.
That
same year, it ceded responsibility for finding a solution to the crisis
to the East African Community under the subsidiarity principle, whereby
peace and security issues are dealt with at the most local level.
The
EAC-led Inter-Burundi Dialogue, with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni
as chief mediator and former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa as
facilitator, tried – and failed – to mediate between the government and
the opposition, both those in exile and those who remained in-country.
From
the start of talks in May 2016, the Burundian government took an
inflexible stance and remained intransigent throughout. The opposition
eventually demonstrated greater willingness to compromise but to no
avail.
For its part, the EAC, which was established to
promote regional economic integration, was ill equipped and underfunded
for a complex political mediation process.
Regional
leaders, who were divided among themselves and did not see Burundi as a
priority, gave Mkapa little support as he sought to bring the parties
together.
The government did not even participate in
the fifth and final round of talks, during which Mkapa drew up a roadmap
to the 2020 elections that he presented as the basis for consideration
by all parties.
If elections are to be more credible
and peaceful, the government will have to compromise. At the very least,
it should allow opponents – both those in the country and those
currently in exile – to campaign freely in Burundi without intimidation,
arrest or violence. It should also let external monitors observe
preparations for the polls, voting and counting.
Smail
Chergui, the AU’s Commissioner for Peace and Security, suggested during
the UN Security Council meeting on Burundi on June 14 that the dialogue
under EAC auspices resume as soon as possible.
Certainly
face-to-face talks between the government and opposition could help
build confidence. But in themselves they are unlikely to generate
different results than previous attempts.
If such talks
are to yield anything, the AU must press regional leaders to use all
their influence to push Nkurunziza’s government toward a compromise.
This
means that the AU itself engages at the highest level in both Bujumbura
and neighbouring capitals. It should put additional pressure on
Nkurunziza while encouraging regional leaders to do the same.
One
important step would be to constitute an AU High-Level Delegation,
similar to the one that visited Bujumbura in February 2016.
That
delegation, comprising the presidents of Gabon, Mauritania, Senegal and
South Africa, as well as Ethiopia’s prime minister, and authorised by
the Assembly of AU Heads of State, visited Burundi only once.
Delegation’s mandate
Leaders
should also extend the delegation’s mandate, either with the same
members or a different composition, to focus on improving conditions for
the 2020 elections and shoring up regional action on Burundi.
The
AU should also ramp up its monitoring of Burundian politics. Since
August 2015, it has deployed a small contingent of human rights
observers and military experts in the country. It should negotiate with
the Burundian authorities to dispatch more.
The AU
team on the ground should monitor opposition politicians’ safety and
evaluate electoral preparations, which may require the AU Heads of State
to adjust the terms of reference.
The AU Peace and
Security Council and the High-Level Delegation can use its reports to
inform diplomatic efforts and help decide whether the AU should deploy
election observers ahead of the 2020 polls.
Completely
free and fair elections in 2020 are likely impossible. But with
higher-level and more consistent and concerted African Union and
regional engagement in the coming year, there is at least a chance to
convince the government to allow the opposition to campaign free from
harassment and for greater scrutiny of the vote. This would likely help
avert a repeat of 2015’s tumult.
It would also preserve
a degree of political pluralism, even if small, that might help prevent
a worse slide into conflict. Most important, the AU and others cannot
remain unresponsive: they must do all they can to keep the Burundi
crisis high on the international agenda.
Elissa
Jobson is head of Africa regional advocacy and Nelleke van de Walle is
deputy project director Central Africa at the International Crisis Group
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