Last week Italy became the first major European economy to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Italy
and China signed 29 deals worth $2.8 billion (Sh282.3bn), and while the
absolute amount agreed to may not be large, this marked an ideological
shift where Italy broke ranks with other powers in the global North by
openly endorsing the BRI which has been subject to deep scepticism and
criticism in both Europe and North America.
Closer to
home, Kenya’s standard gauge railway is a key BRI project in Africa and
exemplifies the opportunities and risks linked to the BRI roll-out in
Africa. There are two key issues to manage on both the African and
Chinese side if the BRI is to be effectively leveraged.
The
first opportunity the BRI presents Africa is addressing the continent’s
infrastructure deficit. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates
Africa’s infrastructure deficit to stand at $170 billion (Sh17.1 trn) a
year.
The BRI is a clear opportunity for African
countries to meet this gap on a long-term basis. Additionally, the
momentum behind the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
provides an opportunity for African governments to link the BRI to the
vision to interconnect the continent and increase the movement of goods,
products and services across Africa.
The second
opportunity for Africa is further opening the continent up to the
Chinese private sector and foreign direct investment (FDI). After years
of the Sino-African relationship being defined by
government-to-government deals (and this still dominates), Chinese
private sector is increasingly coming into Africa on their own terms and
with their own visions.
The BRI opens the continent
further to both Chinese FDI and private sector relocation to Africa
which presents opportunities for job creation, income growth and
increasing Africa’s manufacturing capacity.
However, there are key risks linked with the aforementioned opportunities.
With regards to plugging the infrastructure deficit, there is
clear concern that the BRI may further burden the region with more debt.
When
this is coupled with fiscal opacity in Sino-African government deals,
there is unease that the BRI will not only further indebt African
governments, but also debt will continue to be mismanaged by some
African governments with no pushback from the Chinese government.
Chinese FDI
The
second risk has to do with the quality of Chinese FDI and private
sector engagement in Africa. In many parts of the continent, there are
concerns with regard to the extent to which the Chinese comply with the
environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards in the countries in
which they are domiciled. If the BRI opens Africa up more deeply to
Chinese private sector engagement, it is crucial that concerns with
Chinese private sector activity with regard to ESG standards are
addressed.
The BRI will best serve both African and
Chinese governments and the African people if BRI deals have far more
stringent controls with regards to ESG due diligence, financial
feasibility and financial transparency.
Additionally, the BRI should be more deliberately linked to the AfCFTA and the continent’s vision for interconnectedness.
Secondly,
the Chinese government should begin to hold Chinese firms active abroad
to Chinese legal and ESG requirements. This will prevent laxity on ESG
standards on the part of African governments from being misused and
ensure that Chinese private sector activity in Africa is holistically
beneficial to African publics.
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