Some 90 per cent of Kenya’s urban households living in rented houses, according to the World Bank. FILE PHOTO | NMG
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) attract private financing and
sharing of risks in public projects or programmes. They bypass public
debt yet expand delivery of public services such as sanitation, housing
and transport.
In late 2017, my oversight of expert
findings of the African Development Bank’s latest study on affordable
housing in Kenya under PPPs was an eye opener.
Private
sector project uptakes of PPPs for affordable housing are scarce beyond
a slow-moving pipeline held by the PPP Unit in the National Treasury.
Yet,
this pillar of the President’s “Big-4” Plan is pegged on PPPs. A new
policy can be designed to yield dramatic results in the medium-to-long
term. Obvious fiscal policy biases in the sector need correction.
While the Kenyatta University’s student hostel project is a
pioneer in the PPP pipeline that concentrates on mega-projects planned
between shrewd foreign investors and universities, aiming at increased
rental space of hostels, leisure and retail-markets capacity, such
projects carry foreign exchange risks.
If and when
implemented, they serve a housing category designated as
multiple-occupied-housing (student accommodation, hostels or care homes
or any temporary type buildings, such as caravans). The category does
not fit regular affordable housing.
What is the crisis
of PPP uptake? The first issue in Kenya is, well, costs. According to
the Center for Affordable Housing and Finance (CAHF-2015 and 2016) the
cost of a generic completed and equal-standard formal house in Nairobi
was the highest among 16 African countries (at $63,241) compared to the
lowest cost location, Dar-es-Salaam ($18,630).
Cost in
Kenya is driven mainly by the price of land and a cluster of other
costs. In 2015 and 2016, urban land cost of the generic affordable house
was the third costliest in Africa ($14,826) for comparable units, 120
square metre stand. It was bypassed only by costs in Kampala ($15,229)
and Dakar ($14,874).
Associated components —
infrastructure, compliance, construction, and other development costs
(legal fees, surveying etc.) were among the costliest five and never
below the costliest ten in Africa.
Second, a general
scarcity of housing (called excess demand), drives price escalation.
Scarcity displaces low income households from affordable housing even
when the units are custom-built for them.
Against
policy blueprints targeting the provision of 200,000 housing units
annually for all income levels, less than 50,000 housing units currently
enter the Kenyan market annually; the accumulated deficit is over 2
million units.
A price spiral and speculative holding
of units is a race to the bottom. Higher income households and investors
displace low-income households.
The “Big-4” Plan
target of 500,000 units over five years will face similar displacements
unless policy is altered to address the scarcity that erodes
affordability and that creates a flow of investors on the supply side
(read developers) and on the demand side (read investors who buy not
just for accommodation but for speculation and high rates of return).
As
an asset class, real estate in Kenya consistently outperformed other
classes over the last five years, with returns of over 25 per cent
yearly compared to an average of 10 per cent annually in the traditional
asset classes. Prices in 2013 for instance were nearly three times
those in 2000.
Prices of residential units
outperformed rental yields that averaged only 5 per cent, while office
and retail space averaged 9 per cent per annum and 10 per cent per
annum, respectively.
The market structure leaves some
90 per cent of Kenya’s urban households living in rented houses, as
estimated by the World Bank. Only about 10.2 per cent of urban
households could afford the cheapest newly built house in 2015,
estimated to cost about Sh 1.7 million / $17,000.
High
costs against low incomes (called low effective demand) and growing
informal sources of income exacerbate housing scarcity, supporting the
rental market more than home ownership and depressing formal bank
mortgage lending.
Three key players dominate the
supply of affordable housing: government, saccos, and private sector
developers. It is a tripartite compact.
Each
operates in a cocoon. Government supplies mainly public housing, for
police, civil servants, etc.; the private sector remains reticent to
PPPs, yet benefits from government; a wrong-footed fiscal policy on the
supply side still rewards private sector developers with a 15 per cent
corporate tax waiver if they provide 400 affordable housing units per
year.
Saccos work with meagre financing and little in
government support. No other segment has attracted much PPPs activity
though the PPP Unit as the National Treasury works hard to ensure that
PPP regulatory boxes are ticked.
In the sacco sector,
the National Cooperative Housing Union (NACHU), an apex organisation for
registered primary housing cooperatives, works hard to provide
affordable and decent housing.
NACHU has more than 800
housing cooperatives in eight regions of Kenya. It leads in the
provision of housing microfinance, capacity building and technical
services, unnoticed in fiscal policy or bank lending.
A
third factor hampering affordable housing is financing, an obstacle to
domestic PPPs engagement. It is a double-edged problem: scarcity and
cost of credit to domestic developers for construction; and high-cost
mortgage rates to house buyers.
While saccos and
cooperative networks provide 90 per cent of housing credit in Kenya at
about 12 per cent interest, banks provide only 10 per cent and are
pressing for the interest rate cap of about 14 per cent to be scrapped.
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