Israeli soldiers hold positions at an army deployment near the
Israeli-Gaza border on July 21, 2014. Before the relationship between
Uganda under Idi Amin and Israel soured, Israel had a military training
programme with the Uganda army. PHOTO | AFP 
Summary
- From the freed passengers, the rescue mission planners learnt what kind of guns the hijackers had, and how many they were in number.
- When the news of the hijack broke in Israel, diplomatic efforts were immediately launched to secure the release of the hostages.
- The second option, which was eventually adopted, was to storm Entebbe with a large military force in eight Hercules planes, take over the airport, rescue the hostages, and fly them back to Israel.
Air France Flight No. 135 left Ben Gurion Airport in Israel with 248 passengers on Sunday June 27, 1976.
Among
those on board were four hijackers, two Germans and two Palestinians.
From Israel the flight had a stopover in Athens, Greece, from where
other members of the hijacking group boarded the plane.
On
taking off from Athens, the plane was hijacked and commandeered to
Uganda through Libya, where it stopped over for refuelling, arriving at
Entebbe around 03:00am the next morning.
At Entebbe
those taken hostage were parked in a hall at the airport terminal. The
next day, June 29, non-Jewish hostages were separated and later
released, and only 106 Jews were kept in captivity.
The released hostages were flown to France, where Israeli intelligence met them to gather information about the hostage takers.
From
the freed passengers, the rescue mission planners learnt what kind of
guns the hijackers had, and how many they were in number.
On
the night of July 3 and early hour as of July 4, 1976, four Israeli
Hercules planes carrying commandos landed at Entebbe to rescue the 106
hostages.
When the news of the hijack broke in Israel, diplomatic
efforts were immediately launched to secure the release of the
hostages.
This happened as the military was also
considering a rescue mission, which became unavoidable as the deadline
that the hostage takers had given for the execution of the hostages
loomed.
Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli Prime Minister,
convened a select closed cabinet meeting. One of those in the meeting
was the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff, Mordechai “Motta”’
Gur.
Bibi's brother
When
the military option was decided on, a Special Forces Unit, Sayeret
Matkal, was chosen to execute the operation, working with Golani
infantrymen, Medical Corps, Paratroopers and a fuelling team.
Avi
Weiss, the Sayeret Matkal intelligence officer at the time, says in the
de-classified documents: “Yoni Netanyahu was on his way to the Sinai
Peninsula to prepare for another operation with his troops when he was
called with the news of the plane hijacking.”
Yoni, who
was a brother of Benjamin Netanyahu, who would later become Israeli
prime minister, was the only Israeli soldier to be killed during the
raid on Entebbe.
Before the relationship between Uganda
under Idi Amin and Israel soured, Israel had had a military training
programme with the Uganda army.
Muki Betzer, who
during the operation headed the fire team, had spent four months in
Uganda training the Ugandan army. During the preparations in Israel, he
was asked by the planners to tell them what he knows about the Uganda
army.
“When I walked into Ehud’s office, there were
several officers. I was asked what I knew about the Ugandan army. I told
them. I only trained them for four months. Had I kept training them,
they would be better now. They are scared of their own shadow, and
generally they are not very motivated. And, in this case, I really think
they are not motivated to fight.”
With those remarks,
Ehud Barak tasked Muki to lead the preparations for storming the old
terminal building at Entebbe. But they didn’t have the building’s
architectural designs. Solel Boneh Construction Company, which had built
it, was asked to provide the much needed building’s blueprint.
On
Thursday, July 1, 1976, Yoni Netanyahu met with Dan Shomron, the head
of the Infantry and Paratroopers Branch, who was the overall commander
of the rescue operation. During their meeting, two military rescue
options were presented.
One of the options was to
parachute a military force into Lake Victoria, take over the terminal
building, free the hostages, and transport them by land in vehicles that
would be captured during the takeover to Kenya.
The
second option, which was eventually adopted, was to storm Entebbe with a
large military force in eight Hercules planes, take over the airport,
rescue the hostages, and fly them back to Israel.
“Ehud
Barak arrived in Kenya; we were informed that the plan currently being
discussed to free the hostage was to parachute Shayetet 13, a special
operations Israeli navy unit of commandos with rubber boats, into Lake
Victoria; have them make their way to the airport, raid the terminal,
and release the hostages,” Michael Aharonson, who at the time was a
military instructor in Kenya, said.
Set up in Nairobi
According
to Mr Aharonson, another centre was set up in Nairobi just a day after
it was decided that there should be a rescue mission.
While
they discussed the plan in Nairobi, Aharonson said they were asked from
Israel whether there were crocodiles on the shores of Lake Victoria.
Two Shayeret 13 operatives, including the unit’s deputy commander, flew
to Nairobi and went into Lake Victoria with Aharonson to confirm this.
“We
got our answer as soon as we arrived there. There were crocodiles, and
there were massive Nile crocodiles along the shore, as far as the eye
could see,” Aharonson said.
Having confirmed the presence of crocodiles, the air rescue plan remained the only option.
The Sayeret Matkal commandos were called to base. Sergeant Amir Ofer of the Ammon team was among the first to be called.
“I was already asleep when the phone rang… I immediately made the connection that this had to do with the hijacking,” Ofer said.
Drills
for the mission had to be done quick and fast, for they had less than
72 hours to the deadline given by the hostage takers to execute the
hostages.
Captain Amnon Peled headed what was called
the Amnon Team. He said: “It was during our preparations which included
military simulation exercises, getting on and off the vehicles, drilling
skirmishes, when we got the idea to dress up as Idi Amin’s soldiers in
leopard uniform and Kalashnikovs.”
First sergeant Shlomi Reisman was in the Amnon Team.
He
said: “We knew what we had to do, so we dedicated the little time we
had left to drilling the more specific, technical aspects of the
operation. None of us had ever practised hitching two Land Rovers and a
Mercedes Benz inside a Hercules plane.
Special
attention was given to drilling, quickly unloading the vehicles after
landing; to shorten everything to a minimum time we needed from the
moment the Hercules’ back ramp opened to the moment we arrived at the
old terminal where the hostages were kept.”
Due to the
distance between the two countries, information on what was happening to
the hostages was very limited. Bits of information coming through
Nairobi were not sufficient for proper planning.
Weiss
said: “One of the main points of weakness of this operation was the lack
of an up-to-date contact with the target. I was feeling uneasy, to put
it lightly, because the information we had on the terminal was mostly
based on old plans, and our knowledge of the activity at the old
terminal and around it was only partial.”
It was
initially a secret operation, but word leaked and even those in the
reserve volunteered to go on the mission. When word for the planned
mission leaked, reserve officers of the Sayeret Matkal started making
frantic efforts to be part of the operation.
Danny Arditi, who was a captain by then and commander of the Arditi Team, said: “Out of my dozens of soldiers one could not go.
When
Yoni told me I had to give up one of my soldiers, I was very angry and
started arguing. I really fought for that soldier to the point of almost
walking away. I told Yoni, if he is not participating, then I am not
participating and left his office, furious.”
It was a total of 33 commandos that was finally selected to rescue the hostages.
They
were divided into groups – the fire team led by Muki Betzer; Yiftach
Reicher-Atir led a team that was to clear the customs area and the
second floor of the terminal building; Amnon Peled led the rescuing
group which stormed the hall where the hostages were; Giora Zussman’s
group cleared the other rooms where the hijackers and other Ugandan
soldiers were.
Rami Sherman’s group was to provide fire
cover and the vehicles the rescue team travelled with, and also set up
landing beacons along the runway for the other Hercules planes.
Before
the official approval of the operation to rescue the hostages was made
by the prime minister, four Hercules planes left the Israel capital.
They first stopped at Sharm el-Sheikh, a port city in the Sinai
Peninsula where the Red Sea and the Gulf of Eilat meet.
Sayeret Matkal intelligence officer Avi Weiss saw the last plane to leave Tel Aviv for Sharm el-Sheikh.
“I
left the squadron briefing room with Yoni (Netanyahu), we said goodbye
with a handshake, a pat on the back, and I wished him luck. As I was
waiting, someone arrived with up to date Mossad photographs of the
Entebbe terminal. I took the photos and quickly ran towards the runway. I
managed to signal to the last of the Hercules, a Lockheed C-130, to
stop and open the door. I threw the package of photographs inside and
asked that they be given to Yoni in Sharm el-Sheikh.”
The
photographs had been taken by a ‘warrior’, a Mossad terminology for an
undercover agent. He had flown from Kenya in a light aircraft, flew
around Entebbe airport, took the photos and flew back to Nairobi. Weiss
says these were the last up-to-date pieces of information they had.
First
sergeant Shlomi Reisman was in the Amnon Team. He recounts the
transport arrangement in the plane he was in: “Our vehicles were tied in
a row at the centre of the Hercules plane and all along its length. The
Mercedes was at the back of the plane, facing out, and behind it were
the two Land Rover jeeps. On both sides of the vehicles, dozens of
paratroopers were lying around on the floor.
Our team was sitting at the back end of the second Land Rover.”
The flight to Sharm el-Sheikh was not a smooth one for the soldiers.
“The
plane didn’t have any seats, and didn’t have a bathroom. If you wanted
to pee, you had to pee into a jerrycan. It was a hot summer day and the
more the plane flew, the more it jumped up and down like a wild
stallion. We were sitting on the vehicles, and it just made the
turbulence worse. Everyone’s face around me was green; I thought I must
have been the only one on the plane not throwing up. Eight more hours of
that, and by the time we landed in Entebbe, the terrorists would have
no one left to fight.”
First sergeant Amir Ofer, also
in the Amnon Team, adds: “We got off the plane in Sharm el-Sheikh, and I
asked the doctor to give me pills against nausea and vomiting –
otherwise I would have collapsed. One of the soldiers from the first
raid team collapsed from vomiting during the stopover in Sharm
el-Sheikh, and we had to replace him with one of the soldiers from the
backup force.”
Awaiting clearance
At
Sharm el-Sheikh, the troops waited for clearance for the operation to
proceed. Waiting time as they held off for clearance took its toll on
the soldiers.
Danny Artidi describes the time spent at
Sharm el-Sheikh: “Those were frustrating hours because we were all
nervous, we each sat quietly and didn’t talk to each other much. It
appeared as if we were each in a period of introspection. I was
thinking, how will the operation go? Will I come back alive? And what’s
going to happen to my soldiers? What is going to happen to the hostages?
We all knew there was a chance we would not come back alive from this
mission.”
When the clearance finally came, the four
planes flew south along the Red Sea in a formation low enough not to be
detected by the radars of Iran and Egypt.
Captain
Giora Zussman, who commanded the Zussman Team, says: “The planes were
flying very low over the Red Sea, south of Sharm el-Sheikh, and with
every kilometre we passed, I realised that yes, we were about to do
this.
The second and final part appears tomorrow.
Read how the Israeli commandos landed and how the attack on the old
terminal building was executed.
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