In 1992 Kenya held its first multi-party
election in 26 years. Since this re-introduction of multi-partism, the
“politics of tribe” has been blamed for the country’s tribulations.
This
has led to a system under which leaders channel government resources to
their ethnic supporters to ensure their political survival. In turn,
their supporters begin to feel entitled to government resources.
The
politics of ethnicity therefore becomes an inter-community competition,
not merely for representation in governance, but for resources.
This
isn’t a problem exclusive to Kenya. Studies show that many African
countries are finding it difficult to manage diversity, and particularly
ethnicity.
In other parts of the world such as
Yugoslavia, Burma, and Sri Lanka, ethnicity has been politicised and has
consequently played a major role in triggering violence.
In
Kenya, tribal politics has given rise to rampant corruption,
marginalisation, disenfranchisement of entire communities, and
full-blown violence.
As the country goes into another
General Election this August, two questions are frequently being asked.
Has anything changed since 2007 when violence broke out after a disputed
election?
And are there any real ideological differences between Kenya’s two main coalitions?
A
stock-take of the present ethnic reality shows that tribalism is more
entrenched than ever. The two coalitions are a cluster of parties that
represent regional ethnic blocs.
In fact they have
split the country down the middle along a clear tribal fault line, with
the populous Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribes on one side and the Luo, Luhya
and Kamba on the other.
History of ethnic loyalties
But
why are there such bitter contests every election cycle? It has
everything to do with the possibility of attaining control of State
resources and being in charge of their allocation.
Kenya
has been governed by four presidents from two ethnic communities since
independence: the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. The 40 other communities now
believe that it’s their turn to hold the presidency.
Kenya
is home to 42 ethnic groups. The major ones are the Kikuyu, Luhya,
Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba. Combined, they form 66 per cent of the
country’s population.
The behaviour of Kenyan voters
has remained largely consistent over the past five multi-party
elections. Regardless of where they reside, ethnic allegiance has been
the most influential motivator at the ballot.
This pattern of political allegiance based on ethnicity has a long history dating back to Kenya’s colonial past.
In
Kenya’s first independence General Election in May 1963, the two
largest indigenous parties Kanu, formed in May 1960, and Kadu, formed a
month later, both assumed an ethnic DNA.
Kanu
represented the populous Kikuyu and Luo tribes and Kadu represented the
smaller Masai, Kalenjin, Luhya and Mijikenda communities.
This
was partly because colonial policy barred the formation of nationwide
political movements. It only allowed the formation of district political
associations.
The effect was to encourage ethnically
homogeneous political associations to emerge across the country. As a
result, parties have drawn their political legitimacy and capital from
their respective ethnic bases since independence.
At
Lancaster House — where Kenyan delegates held a series of meetings to
negotiate Kenya’s independence constitution — Kanu and Kadu leaders wore
their ethnic hats.
So historically speaking, political parties have never really been divorced from tribal affiliations.
But
the problem runs much deeper than tribal politics. In Kenya an
ethnically diverse society is responding to an imposed political
configuration which, thanks to its colonial heritage, is a democratic
competition for resources.
If we regard democracy as
elastic rather than rigid, it allows us to recognise that it can be
forced — or negotiated. Negotiated democracy can lead to stability
whereas forced democracy can lead to instability and violence.
A
case in point is Zimbabwe where a power-sharing deal was reached
between Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front
and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change in 2008.
At
the time, the deal brought the country’s political and economic crisis
to an end. Other African examples of negotiated democracies include
South Africa and Rwanda.
In Kenya, negotiated democracy
can be reached by creating more executive positions beyond the
president and deputy president to accommodate feuding tribes: mainly the
Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya.
New structure
Kenya
has tried this model before, and it worked. The power sharing model put
in place after the 2007 election quelled the post-election violence.
The
new structure, guided by the peace accord, created three new executive
positions – a prime minister, and two deputy prime ministers. This
created a more ethnically inclusive leadership.
Constitutionally, a power-sharing agreement may not be as simple to effect as the 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Act.
In
that case, a simple Act of Parliament was passed to create the
positions of a prime minister and his two deputies. Today, the
government would need to call a referendum to create substantive
positions.
But that shouldn’t be a deterrent. Changes like this could lead to a realignment of political parties.
If
representatives of a majority of Kenya’s ethnic groups were guaranteed
senior positions in government, politicians would gradually move away
from ethnicity as a tool for political mobilisation, and towards
ideological campaigns that prioritise socioeconomic development.
Maritim-Maina
is a Research Fellow at the East Africa Resilience Innovation Hub which
receives research funding from the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC) Canada.
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