Suspected Al-Shabab fighters are paraded at the Uganda Force Contingent
headquarters in Mogadishu on February 28, 2014. AFP PHOTO/ ISAAC
KASAMANI
NATION MEDIA GROUP
In the early hours of Tuesday morning, suspected Al-Shabaab
militants entered a tented labourers’ camp in a quarry 10 kilometres
from Mandera, singling out 36 non-Muslims for execution at point-blank
range.
At least two men were beheaded, according to witnesses.
The
quarry killings followed in the wake of a similarly barbaric attack in
the same area two weeks earlier, in which 28 non-Muslim bus
passengers—mostly schoolteachers returning to Nairobi for the holidays –
lost their lives.
The quarry attack made a mockery of
Deputy President William Ruto’s claim that the Kenya Defence Forces
(KDF) had eliminated more than 100 militants involved in the first
massacre.
But the government’s ineptitude in Kenya’s
lawless and economically desolate north-eastern region is nothing new,
with the cancer of corruption remaining one of the greatest impediments
to security.
UNDERMANNED POLICE BRANCHES
The
rampant smuggling of sugar across the porous border, which has the
political backing of wealthy politicians, is a testament to this
national failure.
Though Kenya has four police branches
as well as the General Service Unit (GSU) and KDF stationed along the
700-kilometre frontier, most units are immobile and undermanned.
Nor
does the KDF have the capacity to consistently maintain unmanned aerial
vehicles in the air to spot militants and smugglers crossing the
border.
“Eighty per cent of the time you’ll get through,” a former senior Kenyan intelligence officer told me.
Corruption
among the border security forces has the dual effect of weakening
Kenya’s overall ability to prevent militants from entering the country,
as well as strengthening Al-Shabaab’s finances.
Charcoal
exported through Kismayo, largely to Gulf countries, constituted the
principal source of Al-Shabaab revenue before the KDF seized the port in
September 2012.
Yet the lesser-known trade is the
smuggling of processed sugar from Somalia into Kenya, a consequence of
the Kenyan government’s exorbitant tariffs on sugar imports aimed at
propping up a flagging domestic industry.
AL-SHABAAB'S REVENUE SOURCE
Information
provided to me by a regional intelligence source, dating to early 2011 –
before Al-Shabaab was driven out of Kismayo by the KDF – depicted a
sophisticated sugar smuggling network with links to the Kenyan political
elite.
Through cross-border co-operation with
Al-Shabaab-linked brokers in Dhobley, Somalia, the smuggled sugar
crossed the border at Liboi and passed through the Dadaab refugee camps
before making its way to the regional hub of Garissa.
There
it was stored in several depots – two of which are possibly owned by an
Al-Shabaab affiliate – before being transported to wholesale markets in
Nairobi.
In 2011, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
estimated that Al-Shabaab generated as much as $800,000 (Sh72 million)
from import taxes on sugar.
Although Al-Shabaab’s
defeats in Lower Juba in 2012 mean the group no longer controls the
illicit trade, the smuggling networks that operate it are still active
(the intelligence source speculated that the KDF now had “tentacles” in
the business, having taken over control of the Dhobley-Kismayo road from
Al-Shabaab).
Kenyan sugar prices in the first
quarter of 2014 fell from an average of $43 (Sh3,870) to $36 (Sh3240)
per 50-kilogramme sack due to illegal imports, Kenya Sugar Board CEO
Rosemary Mkok told South Africa’s Financial Mail newspaper in May.
The
black market trade is so entrenched that domestic sugar processors
routinely import cheaper sugar and repackage it under their own brand.
Mohamed Mohamud Hassan is a former smuggler living in Dadaab’s Ifo camp.
LUCRATIVE BUSINESS
Camp
life, he said, includes a mini-cartel made up of a few dozen importers
controlling the trade in sugar – as well as powdered milk, oil, pasta,
rice, cigarettes and clothing items – and colluding to keep the price
around $34 (Sh3,000) for a 50kg sack.
When there are
disagreements among members, he said, the price of a sack can drop to as
low $25 (Sh2,200). Two or three lorries typically arrive in Ifo every
night, each carrying 250 bags of smuggled sugar.
Hassan
stated that for each lorry, the police officers receive a payoff of
around $1,120 (Sh100,000), roughly 15 per cent of the worth of the
shipment. So lucrative are the illicit gains that branches of the Kenyan
security forces compete against one another for bribes.
Mr
Hassan recalled a night when he was transporting a consignment of
smuggled cigarettes and was stopped by an Administration Police (AP)
patrol demanding a payoff.
“We couldn’t agree on an
amount. They wanted too much,” he said. Having no legal jurisdiction to
arrest and hold the smugglers themselves, the officers handed them over
to the local police station.
This second group of
officers was more amenable to negotiating a financial arrangement. They
then agreed to help Mr Hassan evade the AP patrol, still lurking nearby.
“So the police took the cigarettes to the camp in a police car,” Hassan
laughed.
“When the AP officers asked about them, they said that customs agents seized them.”
UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM
A local senior police officer told me that cross-border smuggling is an unsolvable problem, citing the numerous service roads – known as ‘cut lines’ – built by oil companies that make it easy for traffickers to bypass official routes.
UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM
A local senior police officer told me that cross-border smuggling is an unsolvable problem, citing the numerous service roads – known as ‘cut lines’ – built by oil companies that make it easy for traffickers to bypass official routes.
But he pointed to an instance
in August when police had seized 150 sacks of illicit sugar. When such
seizures happen, Mr Hassan said, it is usually because officials from
Nairobi are visiting the district.
“You have to show them that there are people actually doing their jobs,” he said.
The
sometimes under-appreciated link between corruption and national
security is nowhere more salient than in Kenya. Author Michela Wrong
addressed the issue in a May 2014 Foreign Policy article:
“What
perhaps most frustrates the government’s critics is its failure to
trace the causal connection between grand corruption and deteriorating
security in a country once regarded as a rare ‘safe’ African state.”
PAYING THE PRICE
Illustrating the point, the four perpetrators of the September 2013 Westgate mall attack had crossed overland from Somalia into Kenya some four months prior, possibly somewhere around Liboi.
Illustrating the point, the four perpetrators of the September 2013 Westgate mall attack had crossed overland from Somalia into Kenya some four months prior, possibly somewhere around Liboi.
To view the
ease of their entry into Kenya as a distinct issue from the ease with
which smugglers crisscross the border would be naive.
“The
more charcoal exported from Kismayo, the more sugar comes in to Kenya,
the more that border policy in Kenya is distorted, the more smuggling of
other things takes place, and the more dangerous Kenya becomes,” the
regional intelligence source said.
In the aftermath of
Tuesday’s attack, Interior Minister Joseph Ole Lenku and Inspector
General David Kimaiyo took the fall for the broader national security
failure, with the former being sacked and the latter retiring.
But
this cosmetic response has done little to address the underlying
problem. So far, Kenya’s leaders have opted to take the easy way out,
cracking down on the country’s Somali community in lieu of tackling
corruption – what Wrong calls the “eating” culture.
Future generations of Kenyans are likely to pay the price.
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