By Mahmood Mamdani
In Summary
How does one understand the current conflict in
South Sudan? Two major explanations are on offer. The first claims it is
an ethnic struggle between the two largest groups in the country, the
Dinka and the Nuer, the first led by the president, Salva Kiir, and the
second by his deputy, Riek Machar. The second explanation sees it as a
power struggle between individuals in the SPLM/A leadership.
While neither explanation can be ignored, neither
is sufficient to explain the conflict. This is because both ignore key
ingredients: The process of state formation that has further politicised
ethnic allegiance and ideological preferences that both intersect with
and soften ethnic conflict.
The immediate background to the current crisis is
declining support for Kiir, who has hitherto held a monopoly of top
positions, as Chairman of the party (SPLM), the army (SPLA) and as
president of the country. Before Kiir dismissed them from their
respective positions, at least three in the party leadership had
publicly declared their intention to run against him in the coming
elections. One was Machar, second in the state-party leadership. The
second was the Secretary General of the party, Pagan Anum. And the third
was Rebecca Garang, the widow of the late SPLA leader, John Garang.
The opposition to Kiir’s leadership is at several
levels: Personal, ethnic, and ideological. At the individual level, its
root is loss of confidence in Kiir’s leadership ability as he moved to
undercut whatever remained of accountability structures within the state
and the party in order to hold on to power.
At the political level, the causes of the conflict
lie in a process of state formation that has radically politicised
ethnicity. This politicisation has occurred at two levels, the military
and local administration. The army is in reality a bunch of localised
militias, each led by an ethnic coterie of generals.
Local government policy instituted by the new
South Sudan government made ethnic identity the basis of creating local
government units, and thus of access to customary land for peasants and
employment for the urban population. In localities where populations
were ethnically mixed, which is just about everywhere, making ethnic
identity the basis of rights to land and employment was a sure recipe
for breeding ethnic antagonism.
At the ideological level, active opposition to
Kiir includes those who had previously been lukewarm to the call for an
independent South Sudan and had instead called for a closer relationship
with Sudan in the north. This comprises both those who had been
inspired by John Garang’s call for a New Sudan and those who had
followed Machar in looking for an accommodation with the power in the
north.
With the majority in the party against him, Kiir
decided to use the structures of the state to dismantle whatever still
remained of organs of the party. The occasion for this came when his
opponents demanded that he disband the Presidential Unit that he had
newly set up, which he placed not only outside regular army structures
but also more or less under his own control. According to those opposed
to Kiir, though he agreed to do so, he began by disarming only Nuer
soldiers in the unit. When they resisted, he claimed it was an
attempted coup.
When Salva Kiir unilaterally dismissed both the
vice chair and the secretary general of the party, along with other
senior officials, from leadership positions, the move did away with
structures of accountability in both the party and the state. It also
destroyed whatever conflict resolution machinery existed at both levels.
The implications were huge, especially because the
South Sudan army, the SPLA, is less a national army than a coalition of
ethnic militias. SPLA has hundreds of generals, possibly more than any
other army in the world. Not only is every leader in each militia that
joins the SPLA rewarded with the rank of general, these generals are
also assured of continuing command of “their” unit, it being none other
than the militia now bearing a new title.
This is why when the party leadership split, few
were surprised that the army also split. The fighting in South Sudan did
not begin as a civil war. It began in the barracks and then spread to
the surrounding civilian population as soldiers identified and targeted
possible opposition in the civilian population on an ethnic basis.
This then is neither an attempted coup nor a rebel
attempt to take over government. It is, rather, an attempt by the top
leader of government to forestall a vote of no confidence in his
leadership, by dismantling all structures of accountability in a bid to
usurp power.
The political leadership in the region, meeting
under the framework of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) , an eight-country trading bloc in Eastern Africa], has made
things worse by calling on the two sides to the conflict to negotiate,
while brazenly supporting the Kiir faction, where necessary with troops.
Uganda has taken the lead in this.
There is no public information on the number of
Ugandan troops who have entered South Sudan, but estimates vary from
several hundred to several thousand. Ugandan soldiers have entered
South Sudan ostensibly to save Ugandan civilians, but few doubt that
their real purpose is to assist the Kiir faction. This does not bode
well, either for the region, or for Uganda, or for South Sudan.
What then is the way forward? I have two suggestions.
Externally, IGAD countries, and Uganda in particular, continue to view Sudan to the north as an adversary, using lenses crafted in an earlier period. There is need to recognise the importance of cooperation between the two Sudans for ensuring stability on both sides of the border. This is not just because oil excavated in the South passes through and is refined in the North. It is also because important sections of the SPLA, particularly those who man the artillery, come from northern states such as Nuba Mountains. Conflict between the two is likely to exacerbate problems within each. In reality, Sudan to the north is likely to hold the trump card when it comes to influencing the outcome of the conflict in South Sudan.
Externally, IGAD countries, and Uganda in particular, continue to view Sudan to the north as an adversary, using lenses crafted in an earlier period. There is need to recognise the importance of cooperation between the two Sudans for ensuring stability on both sides of the border. This is not just because oil excavated in the South passes through and is refined in the North. It is also because important sections of the SPLA, particularly those who man the artillery, come from northern states such as Nuba Mountains. Conflict between the two is likely to exacerbate problems within each. In reality, Sudan to the north is likely to hold the trump card when it comes to influencing the outcome of the conflict in South Sudan.
For this reason, if for none other, IGAD needs to develop a new
mindset, one that welcomes Sudan in the north as a legitimate member of
the region. Internally, to call for power sharing in South Sudan is to
ignore a central fact: rather than a conflict between two powers, this
war resulted from a split in the power. So the problem is: How do you
reconstitute that power? To end the conflict, one needs to address the
issue that triggered it: A bid for power that undermined all remaining
structures of accountability within the party and the state. To do so
would be to acknowledge the will of the majority in both the party and
the state.
Neither the external nor the internal condition
for peace is possible without a change of political perspective in IGAD
and the region, and a new political leadership in South Sudan.
Prof Mamdani is the executive
director, Makerere Institute of Social Research, Kampala & the
Herbert Lehman Professor of Government, Columbia University, New York
City.
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