There may be more to Westgate and Al-Shabaab than meets the eye

The Westgate Mall. A report by the New York Police Department, based on CCTV footage and open-source information, suggests that all the terrorists probably escaped the Westgate mall within the first day of the attack. PHOTO: NATION/FILE 

In Summary

• The Westgate story has refused to die on the international scene.
• The NYPD report, based on CCTV footage and open-source information, suggests that all the terrorists probably escaped the Westgate mall within the first day of the attack.
• Aid workers have admitted paying “registration” and other fees to Al-Shabaab to access certain areas.

By Rasna Warah
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It is barely three months since the Westgate attack took place, but it seems Kenyans have already “moved on”. As one local journalist told Al Jazeera, “That’s what happens in Kenya” – tragic incidents and their victims are quickly forgotten as soon as the dead are buried.

However, the story has refused to die on the international scene. This month, there was renewed focus on, not just the modus operandi of the Westgate terrorists, but also on the way international actors have played a part in sustaining Al-Shabaab.

A report by the New York Police Department, whose findings have been, predictably, refuted by both the Kenya and the United States governments, has gained the attention of international media. (NYPD has apparently been studying terrorist hotspots around the world since the 9/11 attack in order to better understand how terrorists operate in cities).

The NYPD report, based on CCTV footage and open-source information, suggests that all the terrorists probably escaped the Westgate mall within the first day of the attack.

READ: Westgate attackers may have escaped, New York police report says

A spokesman for the NYPD stated that images of the terrorists disappeared after 12 hours, even though CCTV cameras ran for another 34 hours.

He further claimed that unlike other Al Qaeda-inspired attacks, this one was not intended to be an act of martyrdom, but was “a high-profile attack” intended to inflict as many casualties as possible in the shortest period of time.

NYPD says it is possible that the attackers had planned their escape beforehand, which was made easier by the fact that the perimeter wall around the mall had not been secured during the siege.

These assertions fly in the face of official reports which state that all four terrorists died in the attack. Which begs the question: What happened to their bodies and were DNA tests done?

Another disturbing report by the Heritage Institute of Policy Studies in Mogadishu has revealed that aid agencies may have inadvertently fuelled the war economy in Somalia by financing Al-Shabaab.

In 2011, at the height of the Somalia famine, when I suggested that food aid was being diverted by warlords, including Al-Shabaab, certain UN agencies vehemently denied this.

My assertions were based on eye-witness accounts, as well as sources who told me that diversion of food aid was routine in Somalia.

Furthermore, as it was not in the interest of humanitarian agencies to admit failure (as this would lead to reduced funding), some of the claims about the famine might have even been exaggerated.

This report shows that not only was Al-Shabaab diverting food aid, or using it to “reward” loyalists, but that aid agencies were, in fact, paying “taxes” (or protection money) in areas controlled by the terrorist outfit (which likes to see itself as a “government-in-waiting”).

Aid workers have admitted paying “registration” and other fees to Al-Shabaab to access certain areas. In Bay and Bakool, these fees amounted to $20,000 every six months.

Based on the size and nature of the humanitarian activity, additional taxes would be imposed. One UN agency apparently allocated as much as 10 per cent of its project budget to Al-Shabaab in 2009!

While aid agencies will no doubt say that the alternative to not negotiating with Al-Shabaab would have meant letting people starve or die, the reality is much more complex, and has something to do with the political and strategic objectives of donor countries.

Aid to Somalia has long been perceived — particularly by Somalis themselves — as partial and politically motivated, particularly since the installation of the Western-backed Transitional Federal Government in 2004.

Aid was seen as supporting and strengthening the legitimacy of the TFG, which was widely viewed as corrupt.

Furthermore, lack of coordination between aid agencies — which manage their projects remotely from Nairobi — may have given Al-Shabaab undue advantage.

The report states that aid agencies did not have a coordinated response to Al-Shabaab as any admission of dealings with the latter would have cut off their funding (The US, for instance, imposes severe penalties on those found to be funding terrorist groups).

So much for transparency and accountability.