Hasn’t Kiir learnt from the secrets of transition Kagame and Museveni?

Christopher Kayumba 

By Christopher Kayumba

In Summary

• In political transitions it’s always critical for the leader to play the politics of accommodation, inclusion and power-sharing than antagonise their rivals — at least until they consolidate power, politically and militarily.

The world’s youngest state, the Republic of South Sudan, seems headed for a civil war after reports of a failed coup on December 15 which President Salva Kiir Mayardit blames on his former vice-president, Dr Riek Machar, who vehemently rejects the claim as stage-managed and an excuse to dispose of political opponents.

Within days of President Kiir’s assertion, press reports indicated that between 500 and 700 people had been killed and hundreds displaced as rival armed groups engaged each other in and around Juba and elsewhere — including Jonglei State, now under rebels loyal to Dr Machar led by Gen Peter Gatdet.

So, how did South Sudan suddenly descend into turmoil only months after its second birthday?

Close followers of happenings in South Sudan may not have been surprised by these events. What is probably surprising is how President Kiir had handled himself and his political opponents, bearing in mind the political culture in Sudan generally and South Sudan in particular is informed by decades of war and violent conflict and the language of the gun is how things are done, not how they aren’t.

South Sudan gained independence from the Republic of Sudan on July 9, 2011 following a referendum that January in which the long-suffering citizens of that region voted for self-rule with an overwhelming 98 per cent of the vote.

South Sudan has since been led by Gen Kiir, but what really united the people behind him was more a quest for independence from the discriminatory, Islamist North than charismatic or unified leadership.

In fact, the tug-of-war between him and Dr Machar had always been prevalent as the two only came under the same leadership after an agreement in 2005; the latter led the splinter SPLA-Nasir group from 1991.

What is surprising isn’t that the two are leading different armed factions but that President Kiir took some drastic decisions that have boomeranged. Now, unlike any fellow regional ex-rebel leaders who took power before him, he becomes the first sitting head of state to call for talks with his political enemies — even before he could know where the man who is said to have planned a coup against him is holed up!

While pacifists could hail President Kiir’s call for talks, such a decision, at so early a stage of conflict de-escalation, neither instils confidence that the boss is in charge nor signals to his enemies, namely Dr Machar, that he should play along. It depicts President Kiir as weak — which explains why the latter says he can only negotiate the president’s exit.

So, where did President Kiir go wrong?

To me, he made two critical mistakes that have led his country back to armed conflict. In political transitions it’s always critical for the leader to play the politics of accommodation, inclusion and power-sharing than antagonise their rivals — at least until they consolidate power, politically and militarily.

Fight hardcore armed enemies

This is a lesson President Kiir should have learnt from former rebel leaders who now are heads of state — including President Museveni and President Kagame.

Yes, one can continue to fight hardcore armed enemies, as President Kiir should with Khartoum, if need be, or as President Kagame did with FDLR or President Museveni with LRA, but not individual leaders willing to do business.

When President Kiir dissolved his Cabinet and dismissed key ministers, including his militarily and politically strong VP, it was only a matter of days before the nation exploded — again. That this came on the heels of his sacking the governors of Lake and Unity states and the politically strong SPLM secretary-general Pagan Amum didn’t help matters.