This narrative that Kenya is overbanked, in my opinion, is pure hot air, from teeth to tail.
I actively track some of Kenya’s key peer banking markets
within the region and here is the only market where they have
accentuated niche leadership rather than overall market leadership.
Consider the six tier-1 banks. With the exception of KCB and Co-operative—both
of which operate what I christen as the ‘supermarket’ model, the rest
have core specialties, both on the funding and asset fronts, for which
they have built capacity over time.
Barclays, as we know it, has always been the market leader in ring-fenced retail lending. Equity has built strong leadership in SME lending.
Standard Chartered, CfC Stanbic
and CBA have built strong relationships with large corporates and
multinationals. Even if you glide your fingers down to the tier II
space, all the 15 are almost specialty shops in terms of lending.
With this heterogeneity in terms of asset
strategies, criss-crossing segments among banks often become difficult.
This is a sharp contrast to other key peer markets.
In Nigeria, where regulations forced consolidation,
the top five banks, which combined control more than half industry
assets and, therefore, considerably representative of the sector and its
trends, have a heavy bias towards one single strategy—wholesale lending
(corporate and commercial banking).
In fact, these business segments combined account for nearly 90 per cent of their loan books.
The story isn’t much different in Ghana where top
10 banks with the exception of Ghana Commercial Bank, are wholesale
players. I see a similar scenario even as far as Côte d’Ivoire. In
markets, such as these, market-driven consolidation is easy to realise.
However, in Kenya, where asset strategies are
excruciatingly heterogeneous, any talk about consolidation has to
gravitate around horizontal consolidation.
A good example is where a mature SME-focused bank
wants to add asset finance to its product offerings by acquiring an
asset-finance focused bank—after which it’s just a question of
cross-selling.
This is what can drive consolidation. Vertical
consolidation—where, for instance, a large corporate-focused bank
acquires a retail bank—is likely to be a rarity.
In fact, in pursuit of new growth frontiers within
their segments, banks have continued to innovate day-in-day-out rather
than seek brownfield opportunities, especially around distribution. And
really this is what has driven financial inclusion to the current high
levels.
There is also the school of thought that
consolidation will incubate fewer and stronger banks capable of
supporting large ticket transactions. This may not be entirely true.
Over the last seven years or so, I’m yet to see a
transaction in this market that requires stronger balance sheets--with
the exception of recent large-ticket borrowings by the Treasury, Kenya Power and Kenya Pipeline Corporation, which are really outliers, and often sourced externally.
In fact, some of the precedent transactions
consummated locally have rarely exceeded $30 million in size. I’m
convinced that ticket sizes of this quantum do not require stronger
balance sheets.
Further, I don’t think consolidation will solve some of the
common balance sheet constraints—such as lack of long term liabilities
as well as foreign currency shortages.
As and when Kenya commences commercial crude oil
production, the balance sheet capacity of local banks, even after
consolidation and due to their inability to source low-cost foreign
currency customer liabilities, will still be unable to finely price the
acquisition of any of those upstream and midstream assets; leave a lone
the fact that the transaction sizes could be much larger, and could be
relegated to value-chain financing, among other crumbs.
Therefore, it is my considered opinion that the banking sector consolidation narrative being floated around is tenuous at best.
Mr Bodo is an investment analyst. Email: george.bodo@gmail.com
No comments :
Post a Comment