How US, local politics are stoking Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab terror embers

A soldier directs a military truck through a bridge at Ngala connecting Nigeria and Cameroon on May 11, 2014 which was destroyed by suspected Boko Haram insurgents during an attack on May 5, 2014 at Ngala in Gamboru, Ngala district, Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. PHOTO | AFP  AFP

In Summary

• Securing the nation: It is sheer folly for Kenya and Nigeria not to look beyond the military solution as threats from terrorists rise

By FUMNI OLONISAKIN
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By Godwin Murunga
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The African Leadership Centre in Nairobi, in collaboration with the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, hosted an International conference on Security and Society in Africa this week.

 

The idea of the conference was mooted in October 2013 with the support of Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, the Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences.

Though the conference did not focus directly on Kenya and Nigeria, it provided a basis to highlight issues that citizens, leaders and policy practitioners will find valuable.

First, the key dangers of Boko Haram (BK) in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Kenya go beyond the current regimes in terms of their ability to radicalise segments of society, fragment communities and open a vent for further insecurity.

These dangers are real in Nigeria and Kenya, and in West and East Africa generally. The terror unleashed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Kenya reveals certain similarities in aspects of their evolution, the accompanying elite behaviour and response patterns. This pattern helps explain why neither of these countries is winning the war on terrorism.

Northern Nigeria, for instance, has a history of socio-economic exclusion, inequality and neglect. Although the region had a previous history of influence by radical Islam as witnessed by the Maitatsine crisis of the 1980s, the influence of radical version of Islam advanced by “Jama’atu Ahl As-Suna Li-D’awati Wal Jihad” (Boko Haram) dates around 2002. This group did not initially spread violence.

Its ranks were fuelled by local unemployed youth and refugees fleeing conflict in neighbouring Chad because Boko Haram provided them food and shelter. Under Mohammed Yusuf (its former leader), Boko Haram became influential, attracting local sympathisers. It was initially sustained through members’ contributions. An armed group grew out of this militant group.

Al-Shabaab also has origins in contexts of deprivation, war and state collapse in Somalia with its ranks being informed by those returning from the fighting in Afghanistan.

As an outfit, it grew out of Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group that sprung up by recruiting poor youth in Somalia. The ICU grew to provide basic services and organised society after years of the collapsed Somalia state.

Shortly afterwards, the international community, driven by myopic US interests redefined the movement as a terrorist group. It then supported a shadow war with Ethiopia as proxy.

It was this context that led to the rise of Al-Shabaab. When it was declared a terrorist group, it controlled most of southern Somalia through governance structures that functioned better than those of institutions backed by the West.

It engaged in development work like building roads in southern Somalia. Taxes were paid to Al-Shabaab by most organisations that operated there. It was later defeated by African Union Mission to Somalia (Amisom) troops and lost territories under its control.

Broadly speaking, elite attitude transformed Boko Haram’s brutal behaviour and influence on the society just like similar transnational elite intervention explains the transformation of ICU into a radical group.

RESURGENCE OF BOKO HARAM

Local politicians silently contributed to Boko Haram financially and wooed its leadership, seeking political support and protection. So did wealthy businesspeople who wanted their protection from attacks.

A member of the sect, Fuji Boi, was even appointed a Commissioner for Water Resources in Borno State, which led to Boko Haram’s support for the government. He was killed in 2009.

Although the group was said to have increased its financial base through occasional armed robbery of banks and of wealthy individuals, it only became violently radicalised due to the action of political elite. Clashes with state security forces began gradually but escalated in 2009 when Boko Haram was attacked by security forces during a burial.

Boko Haram’s resurgence under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau has spread terror beyond Borno to other northern states and pursued their grievances with vigour.

Regardless of the roots outlined above, the Nigerian and Kenyan governments have consistently pursued one narrative and strategy. Their narrative is that BK and Al-Shabaab are part of a problem of global terror.

This caters to their global audience and invariably attracts actors like the US to Nigeria and their covert involvement in Kenya. In both cases, the only strategy is a military one even though this has failed miserably and not forced a change of strategy.

The recent indiscriminate arrests of people of Somali extraction, a statement of their collective guilt, has alienated them and generated indifference in many quarters to Kenya’s genuine security concerns.

The ruling elite continues to see everything in terms of its immediate political interests and it has no useful method of introspection that allow it to be creative about the solution in the face of growing complexity of the security challenge.

Although the casualty rate is kept under wraps, the Nigerian military has lost so many men to BK and victory is not in sight. Yet negotiations are not being pursued. Nigeria’s ruling elite risk escalating this crisis because of their own political agenda and a potential interest in keeping the crisis going until after the elections.

If moments of opportunity are not seized to contain this phenomenon through other strategies, this BK crisis risks becoming regional like the Al-Shabaab threat which has grown to cause panic in Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Nigeria is heavily influenced by the US, which refuses to negotiate with “terrorists” as 200-plus girls remain in BK custody. Here, a major chance to transform things through negotiations is being lost. And yet, France, UK, US have been known to negotiate when their own citizens are under siege! It is sheer folly not to look beyond the military solution.

Dr Olonisakin is the Founding Director of the African Leadership Centre while Dr Murunga is the current Acting Director of the Centre.