Amisom soldiers near the Somali town of Qoryooley on March 22, 2014,
during an offensive to take it back from Al Shabaab. When East Africa
celebrates its coming of age, it will thank the Somali terror group as
an unlikely sources for helping it find its mojo. PHOTO | AFP
Today, unlike a year ago, there is a sense of some sort of peace
settling over the EAC, the Horn, and
the Central Africa swathe. The prospect of fortunes to be made is becoming more tempting.
the Central Africa swathe. The prospect of fortunes to be made is becoming more tempting.
It
could actually be true that what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.
One day, in the years ahead, when East Africa celebrates its coming of
age, it will thank two most unlikely sources for helping it find its
mojo – the Somali terror group Al Shabaab, and the deadly conflicts in
the region.
So it was that Rwanda and Burundi formally
joined the East African Community in June 2007, at the regional bloc’s
5th Heads of State Summit in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, bringing its
membership to five.
Earlier in March, Uganda had
become the first country to deploy its troops to Somalia as part of the
African Union’s peacekeeping force in the country, Amisom. It was as
politically and geopolitically significant a move as it was audacious.
The
mission flew in blind, losing a transporter after it was shot down as
it attempted to land at Aden Adde International Airport in Al
Shabaab-controlled Mogadishu (the troops escaped with only shock and
minor bruises), and then fought their way to take ground.
Until
then, Uganda had kept its military adventures largely to East and
Central Africa; southwards towards the border with Angola on the
Democratic Republic of Congo side; and towards the north and Horn, in
South Sudan.
In 2004, Rwanda had become the first country in East Africa to
dip its toes in the Horn of Africa’s stormy peacekeeping waters, when it
sent troops to Sudan’s troubled Darfur region.
By the
end of 2013, with Tanzania having joined the United Nations Organisation
Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Monusco), as the Big Daddy in its “Intervention Brigade,” and Kenya’s
punish-Shabaab invasion of 2011 shape-shifting in 2012, when it changed
to an Amisom mission, all the five EAC states were somewhere in Africa
trying to save a corner of it.
Burundi had become the
second country to enter Somalia’s treacherous terrain, when it joined
Uganda as part of Amisom in December 2007.
Though these
military roles became controversial in some circles fairly early, they
nevertheless had a salutary effect, first, because they were an antidote
to East African parochialism.
Second, and most
critically, in Al Shabaab, the East African peacekeepers faced a foe
like no other – committed, brutal, brave and skilled fighters enjoying
support among sections of Somalis who admired the militants for their
effectiveness and lack of corruption, in the areas they controlled.
Shabaab fighters gave as good as they received.
When
I was in Mogadishu after they had finally been kicked out of the
district, I couldn’t find a single Amisom soldier who didn’t speak of
the Shabaab without grudging respect, even if they hated them.
But
there were two other critical things; the Ugandans spoke admiringly of
the Burundi troops. Because Amisom troops use their own equipment, for
which they are reimbursed by the UN (creating a side racket for the
military chiefs and some big people in the troop-contributing countries)
the Burundians arrived in Mogadishu without the heavy weaponry the
Ugandans had. They had little beyond their AK-47s.
Big knocks
In
the rubble of Mogadishu that Al Shabaab fighters had mastered like the
back of their hands, that was inviting slaughter. They took big knocks,
but the Burundians prevailed in the end.
Somalia did
several other things for Burundi. It was the first time the country had
undertaken any legal geopolitical enterprise outside out the valley that
is Bujumbura. Until then, it had mostly dabbled in the ungoverned areas
of eastern DR Congo near its border.
Though there is a
salary apartheid, in which Amisom troops are paid less than other UN
peacekeepers, for a country like Burundi the money was still about seven
to 10 times the pay for soldiers back home.
Amisom
duty, therefore, has produced a larger middle class in Burundi than any
other activity in the strife-torn country over the past 20 years.
Without Amisom dynamics, the coup against President Pierre Nkurunziza in
2015 might well have succeeded.
Some commentators
have argued that uncertainty about how his overthrow would affect the
military’s prospects of continuing to milk the Amisom cash cow led to
the bulk of the opposition to it.
Second, for the East
African Community, one of the most enduring outcomes of the Somalia
campaign — the blowback of the Shabaab attacks in Nairobi and Kampala,
and its threats to Burundi — have been a strong camaraderie among the
soldiers, and an extensive alliance among East Africa’s counterterrorism
securocrats. These see a unified East African security architecture as
critical to defeating the Shabaab.
For almost 10 years,
doing something with Amisom – buying arms from rogue elements in it and
on-selling to Al Shabaab; smuggling charcoal or sugar; supplying the
troops; working as Kiswahili translators – was the biggest gig in a
Mogadishu disrupted by years of war. To get a piece of it, you needed to
speak Kiswahili, which is the language of the Amisom troops, especially
the Burundians who don’t speak English.
Perhaps it is
here that Amisom, years after it leaves Somalia, will have left an
indelible mark. Together with the effect of returning Somali refugees
from many years in camps in Kenya, and the disproportionate influence of
Kenyan Somalis on Somalia, the Amisom has effectively “Swahilinised”
the country, and probably changed its character forever.
As
we shall explore in the final part of the series, this has far-reaching
consequences for the future shape of the EAC, especially how Somalia
and Ethiopia engage with the EAC zone in the near future; and the tone
it has given to the growing role of “Somali capital” in East Africa.
Guns, blood and gore
But
guns, blood and gore were not content to have their say in the region
out of Somalia only. In December 2013, barely two years as a new nation
and eight years after the January 9, 2005 peace accord in Nairobi signed
by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the government of
Sudan, ending a nearly three-decades-long civil war, Juba went up in
flames again.
A conflict perhaps more savage than the
civil war against Khartoum broke out after President Salva Kiir fell out
with his then deputy Riek Machar. To date, the war has killed nearly
400,000 people, internally displaced close to three million, and sent a
similar number fleeing as refugees into neighbouring countries. The stories of rape and brutal killings are from a hell no one would wish on their enemies.
Uganda’s
President Yoweri Museveni, an old ally of the SPLM in its war against
Khartoum — a man who sees South Sudan as an important buffer against
extremist jihadist forces from the north, and an important flank in the
war against anti-Kampala rebel forces in eastern DRC, including remnants
of the Lord’s Resistance Army — rushed the Uganda People’s Defence
Forces to save Kiir’s government from being overrun.
Two
other EAC countries got involved, but on different sides. Rwanda sent a
significant contingent to join the UN Mission in South Sudan (Unmiss),
established to protect civilians during the country’s descent into
madness. Kenya too sent both troops and police to do Unmiss duty.
Kenya,
however, started withdrawing from the mission, stewing at what it
considered humiliation by the UN, after an inquiry found that Unmiss
failed to respond to an attack in July 2016 on the Terrain Hotel
compound, on the outskirts of Juba. Journalists were killed and aid
workers gang-raped, as pro-regime troops ran wild. The UN sacked Kenyan
commander Lt-Gen Johnson Ondieki.
This was the first
time EAC countries were doing peacekeeping in another EAC state. For
Rwanda, this allowed it to consolidate its “peacekeeper” image,
cementing its position as Africa’s, and also one of the world’s, largest
contributors to UN peacekeeping.
Kenya’s tantrum was
meat for China, which moved in and quickly picked up the pieces Nairobi
had thrown away, allowing it to shadow the Blue Helmets with its new
military base in Djibouti.
But blink and you miss it.
While Kenya stormed out of Unmiss because of wounded national pride, in
reality it might also have been because of more hardnosed realpolitik
considerations.
Not able to sell oil, with inflation
shooting up to over 70 per cent in 2016, the South Sudan pound crashing
through the floor, and an empty Treasury, Juba couldn’t pay civil
servants or troops, whom it needed to keep loyal. There were only a few
places in South Sudan that had dollars stashed away: Kenyan banks,
especially KCB, and Equity Bank.
Because South Sudan
had made it impossible for foreign banks to repatriate their earnings in
foreign exchange, the flood of Kenyan companies into South Sudan after
2005 kept their dollar earnings in Kenyan banks there. Kenyan banks,
which had quickly become the leading commercial lenders, too, piled up
forex in their vaults.
Begging bowl
Facing
ruin, the Kiir government in Juba turned with a begging bowl in one
hand, and a gun in the other, to the Kenyan banks. For months, Kenyan
banks became South Sudan’s unofficial central bank.
The
exact details of what negotiations went on behind the scenes remain
unknown. There is a view that Nairobi got involved as a guarantor to the
Kenyan banks that their money would be paid, perhaps because it found
some comfort in the fact that South Sudan had joined the EAC in April
2016 as its sixth member, giving it an additional lever for ensuring
Juba’s future compliance.
Additionally, in the
drawn-out and frustrating South Sudan peace negotiations between Kiir
and Machar, there was a feeling that the process was being hobbled by
rivalries between Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan to have their
positions and interests take precedence. Kenyan money seems to have
bought Nairobi an edge in Juba. Before long, the South Sudan
belligerents were trooping to State House Nairobi to pay homage to
President Uhuru Kenyatta and for photo ops.
Matters
were helped by other opportune developments outside the EAC. In South
Africa, Jacob Zuma, who had taken a hostile position against Machar, and
whose government was keeping him under house arrest, was ousted in
February 2018, letting the rebel leader off the leash.
But
Machar couldn’t profit, because in Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir’s
position was weakening as economic problems mounted, and protests
started to grow.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s
ascent to power in April 2018 rattled his cage further. Dr Abiy’s
dramatic peace overtures to long-term Addis Ababa foe, Isaias Afeworki’s
Eritrea, and the quick restoration of diplomatic and business relations
between the two economies pried an important ally in the Horn out of
Bashir’s corner, leaving him more vulnerable.
Abiy also
dialled down the ruling Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary
Front’s strident national security posture, thus taking a foot off the
political pedal in South Sudan, allowing an EAC Kampala-Nairobi
axis-driven sense of realism to return to the Juba peace talks.
Today,
unlike a year ago, there is a sense of some sort of peace settling over
the whole of the EAC, the Horn, and the Central Africa swathe. The
prospect of fortunes to be made is becoming more tempting.
If
Abiy were to put out the fires in Ethiopia, and persisted in political
and economic reforms, it will add a whopping 110 million people who live
in relatively free political and economic conditions to the East
African region.
The “Eastern Africa region” (defined by
the UN as 20 nations all the way from Djibouti, South Sudan and
Mozambique, to Zambia) is the biggest region by population in Africa,
currently at 457 million people, compared with West Africa at 402
million, while Middle Africa, covered by DRC and Cameroon, has 178
million people. Southern Africa is declining.
The
region is in the middle of a baby boom of citizens born after 2000, who
do not know a life without fast speed Internet, and who are entering
their adulthood in 2019.
The future of this potentially
lucrative region is being determined both by itself, but also by what
China does in the region, the growing superpower rivalry up the road in
the Horn, the outcomes of the Abiy reforms in Ethiopia, and how Kenyan
money behaves.
Next week, in the last part of the series, we look at these and other factors shaping this part of Africa.
Part 1 - Invisible hand that drives East Africa integration:
As the East African Community prepares to mark the 20th year since its
revival, in the series, we assess the things that hold the bloc together
that could also break it
Part 2 - War drums in EAC, or a game of chess?:
We look at whether Rwanda and Uganda, or Burundi and Rwanda could go to
war; how Uganda’s oil pipeline through Tanzania is about everything
else but oil...
Charles Onyango-Obbo is publisher of Africapedia.com and explainer Roguechiefs.com. Twitter@cobbo3
No comments:
Post a Comment