Managing a young state that aspires for full democracy alongside traditional values usually poses special challenges.
Currently,
Uganda is embroiled in a controversy surrounding a struggle between the
Ombudsman — called the Inspector General of Government (IGG) — and the
Governor of the Bank of Uganda.
The cause of the fight
is that the IGG is opposed to administrative staff changes made by the
governor. The argument is whether the IGG has power to call the central
bank governor to order, yet the central bank’s independence is enshrined
in the Constitution.
The governor, Prof Tumusiime
Mutebile, is an economist and banker of formidable reputation, generally
regarded as the father of Uganda’s economic reforms, which he initiated
when he was Treasury Secretary in the 1980s and ‘90s, and later as
central bank governor. So he has midwifed both the fiscal and monetary
reforms over the past three decades.
This he achieved not as a soft “yes man,” but a tough economic operator facing off with the country’s top authority.
Mutebile’s
biggest fight came eight years ago, when he opposed “facilitating” a
transaction to purchase military stuff. The state muscled its way and
Mutebile called President Yoweri Museveni indisciplined in – of all
spaces - The Financial Times of London.
So, a
cadre Mutebile never was. (The term cadre is used derogatorily in
Uganda to describe regime apologists in high places.) But now, the IGG
is shining a spotlight on the dangers of central bank: When a non-cadre
governor turns rebel, who can call him to order?
The
central bank governorship is not the only protected office in the
country. The Director of Public Prosecutions is also supposed to operate
independently. But there have been times when citizens have tried to
institute private prosecution against powerful officials, whom the
government does not seem to be so keen on prosecuting.
When
such happens, the public has come to expect the DPP to take over the
case (the office of the DPP has the authority to do so) only to “lose
interest” in the matter, effectively killing it.
The
judges — high court and higher courts — are also supposed to be
independent. Nobody wants to offend a judge but going by what some
judges say of fellow judges, the term “independence” can really be
elastic, and yet compressible.
The independence of some
key offices which are “not subject to being directed” and so on and so
forth is crucial, but the African traditional reality of authority can
overwhelm them.
The national parliament is what makes
you wonder what independence really means. A senior official recently
said that legislators are now finding it hard to face their constituents
since passing an amendment removing the presidential age limit from the
Constitution.
Surveys had shown that a majority of
the electorate were against the amendment, but the MPs ignored their
sentiments. They discussed it in the ruling party caucus and decided to
pass it.
So, while parliament is clearly not
independent of the ruling party machine, is it desirable to allow them
full independence? What if they become rebellious and using their power,
extend their term to 50 years without facing regular elections?
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